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The basic equality of all human beings is challenged by an ethics of exclusion on 
various fronts, not least of which is the push to exclude severely mentally disabled 
human beings. The topic of severe mental disability raises numerous issues of interest. 
This­reflection­explores­two­fundamental­issues­raised­by­severe­mental­disability.­
The­first­is­how­to­properly­define­disability­itself,­and­the­second­is­the­moral­status­
of severely mentally disabled human beings.
How­should­we­define­disability?­It­is­fairly­easy­to­distinguish­mental­dis-
ability (e.g., inability to reason) from physical disability (e.g., inability to walk), but 
what­exactly­is­disability­itself?­Unless­we­understand­what­a­disability­is,­we­will­
be at a disadvantage in trying to understand mental disability and its relationship to 
moral status. Let us consider four different accounts of disability, namely, the species 
norm account, the socially constructed account, the local but not global “difference 
maker” account, and the welfarist account
The­species­norm­account­defines­disability­in­terms­of­disease.­Drawing­on­
the work of Christopher Boorse, Julian Savulescu’s account of disease involves the 
following­elements:­
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform functional 
design;­specifically,­an­age­group­of­a­sex­of­a­species.­
2. A normal function is a part or process within members of the reference class 
and is a statistically typical contribution by it to their individual survival 
and reproduction. 
3. A disease is a type of internal state that is either an impairment of normal 
functional ability, that is, a reduction of one or more functional abilities 
below­ typical­efficiency,­or­a­ limitation­on­ functional­ability­caused­by­
environmental agents. 
4.  Health is the absence of disease.1
1 Julian Savulescu, “Autonomy, Well-Being, Disease, and Disability,” Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, and Psychology 16.1­(March­2009):­61,­quoting­Christopher­Boorse,­“A­Rebuttal­
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If­we­define­disability­in­terms­of­Boorse’s­elements­of­disease,­then­a­disability­
is an impairment of normal function with respect to one’s own reference class of organ-
isms. Among the advantages of this understanding of disability is that it is biologically 
and empirically based so as to facilitate objective judgments about various conditions. 
It is also an understanding of disability that facilitates an easy link with the goals of 
medicine as eliminating disease. This understanding of disability could cover both 
human beings and other creatures, but what would count as a disability for a human 
being would differ from what would count as a disability for bird. For a human being, 
the inability to speak at twenty years of age is a disability, though it would not be for 
a­bird.­For­a­bird,­the­inability­to­fly­is­a­disability,­but­not­for­a­human­being.
However,­defining­disability­in­terms­of­the­normal­function­of­a­particular­
species­is­not­universally­accepted.­As­Savulescu­points­out,­defining­disability,­and­
thereby also mental disability, in this way would render some characteristics—such 
as deafness in old age—as non-disabilities because it is not a normal function of a 
person in advanced old age to have hearing like a younger person. Likewise, sexual 
dysfunction in men becomes increasingly prevalent as men age, yet this too (though 
not outside of the norm for the reference class of elderly men) is a kind of disability.2 
Among the chief critics of the species norm understanding of disability are those 
who understand disability as socially constructed. Disability, according to this view, 
is not better or worse than typical functionality but only appears “worse” because 
of social conditions. The socially constructed account of disability understands the 
difficulties­ faced­by­disabled­people­as­ the­result­of­ the­way­in­which­society­ is­
structured. Disabled people are different from nondisabled people, but this differ-
ence­becomes­a­difficulty,­a­negative,­for­disabled­people­only­because­of­the­way­in­
which­their­societies­are­organized.­Prejudice­against­disabled­people,­thoughtless­
construction­of­buildings­ that­ limit­access­ for­ the­handicapped,­and­ internalized­
self-disregard­make­the­lives­of­handicapped­people­much­more­difficult,­when­in­
fact their lives are not worse than those of nondisabled people, only different. What 
is considered a disability in one society may be a great advantage in another society. 
Consider, for example, a society in which frequent and loud noises erupt randomly 
and disturb the concentration of those with normal hearing. In such a society, deaf-
ness would be an advantage in terms of facilitating focus on a task at hand. Indeed, 
even in contemporary American society, some disabled people say that their lives are 
actually better than those without disabilities. Thus, for example, some deaf parents 
seek to ensure that their own children will also be deaf. 
There is an element of truth in this account of disability. Stereotypes about 
disabled people, fear of those who are different, and the inconsiderate construction 
of buildings do indeed contribute to making the lives of disabled people more dif-
ficult.­It­is­also­true­that­what­is­disadvantageous­in­some­circumstances­becomes­
advantageous in others. If a cruel dictator were killing all members of your group 
except those who were quadriplegic, it would be advantageous to be quadriplegic. 
on Health,” in What Is Disease?,­ed.­J.­M.­Humber­and­R.­F.­Almeder­(Totowa,­NJ:­Humana­
Press,­1997),­1–135.
2 Ibid., 63.
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Yet the socially constructed account of disability fails to take into consideration 
that some negative aspects of disability are not socially constructed. Consider a blind, 
quadriplegic woman alone on a desert island. No one is prejudiced against her; no 
one is making buildings that she cannot enter. Yet the blind, quadriplegic woman 
is not only different than she would be if she had sight and mobility, but is also at a 
serious disadvantage for survival. It is not simply a matter of survival in particular 
circumstances, however. To see and to move is good for a human being in virtue of 
the nature of the human body. If a mature human being lacks such abilities, he suffers 
a lack of due perfection in the objective physical order regardless of his subjective 
desires or circumstances. The goodness of a health remains good even if in some 
circumstances evil results from having health; the badness of disease remains bad 
even if good results from it in some circumstances. That good can come from evil 
or evil come from good does not change good into evil or evil into good. Another 
drawback of the socially constructed view is that, if being disabled is really not any 
worse than not being disabled, then there is nothing whatsoever wrong with inten-
tionally rendering one’s own healthy child deaf, blind, or limbless. 
Elizabeth­Barnes­seeks­a­third­definition­of­disability­that­falls­between­the­
species norm account and the social construction account. She construes disability 
as a local but not global difference maker.3 According to her view, disability does 
not render the entire life of a disabled person worse, because many disabled people 
are able to have a good life; indeed, all things considered, sometimes disabled 
people have better lives than many able-bodied persons. Advocates of the socially 
constructed view are right that having a disability does not necessarily make a life 
not worth living. Yet, although disability is not a global difference maker rendering 
the whole of life worse, a disability does make a negative difference with respect to a 
particular part of life. Therefore, all things considered, the life of a blind person may 
be as good as or better than the life of any particular person with sight, yet locally, 
the blind person’s life is worse with respect to seeing things. 
The distinctions drawn by Barnes seem entirely correct, yet they are not much 
help­in­defining­“disability.”­One­might­make­similar­claims­about­being­Jewish.­
Being Jewish does not mean that your life overall will be worse or better than a 
Gentile’s life. Some circumstances, such as widespread anti-Semitism, make a 
Jewish­life­worse.­These­observations,­while­true,­do­not­define­what­it­means­to­be­
Jewish. Likewise, Barnes’s remarks, though accurate, do not help much in the quest 
to­define­“disability”—which­is­precisely­what­the­species­norm­account­and­the­
socially constructed account sought to do. 
Savulescu offers a fourth account of disability, called the welfarist account, in 
which a condition counts as a disability if it is a relatively stable physical or psycho-
logical condition that tends to reduce a person’s well-being. He writes, “According 
to a welfarist account of disability, . . . a disability is a relatively stable physical or 
psychological condition X of person P [that] counts as a disability in circumstances C 
3 Elizabeth­Barnes,­ “Disability,­Minority,­ and­Difference,”­ Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 26.4­(November­2009):­337–355.
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if and only if X tends to reduce the amount of well-being that this person will enjoy 
in C. . . . This is a welfarist account of disability that relates disability to well-being.” 4 
The­next­question­is­what­constitutes­well-being:­is­it­merely­a­subjective­state,­
is­it­an­objective­state,­or­is­it­both?­Savulescu­writes,­“I­hold­a­mixed­hedonistic­
and objective account of well-being. Well-being is in part constituted by hedonic 
states like pleasure and absence of pain. But it is also associated with engaging in 
objectively valuable activities, like gaining knowledge, developing one’s talents, 
having deep personal relationships, appreciating beauty, and so on.” 5 
This­view­is­plausible­and­yet­deficient.­Gaining­knowledge­and­having­deep­
personal relationships are objectively worthy ends, basic human goods, but proper 
understanding of these goods is incompatible with thinking that pleasure as such 
is a part of human well-being. Savulescu rightly points out that human well-being 
involves “deep relationships,” yet not all deep relationships contribute equally to human 
well-being. A morally bad person cannot have deep personal relationships, at least 
not in the sense of Aristotle’s friendship of virtue. Part of what makes it impossible 
for vicious people to have such friendships is that they take pleasure in the wrong 
things:­pleasure­itself­draws­them­toward­evil­actions.­The­defective­character­of­the­
vicious person causes the evil end to appear good. Taking pleasure in evil activities 
is injurious to well-being because it both inhibits friendships of virtue and because 
it inhibits knowledge. A vicious man, driven by evil pleasures, is not inhibited from 
gaining knowledge of a theoretical kind, but is prevented from having fully practical 
knowledge of what is good, because this type of knowledge is gained only through 
good action. A bad man qua bad does not perform good actions and so cannot know 
them as performed. Thus, human well-being is not constituted by experiencing plea-
sure and a lack of pain as such. Pleasures and pains are relative to the activities that 
are chosen. If an activity is evil (not contributing to authentic well-being properly 
understood), then the pleasure derived (even if quite intense) is evil. If a chosen activ-
ity is good, then the pleasure derived from it does contribute to authentic well-being. 
Disability cannot therefore be reduced to well-being, as understood in  Savulescu’s 
sense, because although an evil man cannot experience full well-being—because he 
is cut off from virtuous friendships and practical knowledge of the good—not all evil 
agents are disabled. It is equally obvious that a morally good person might actually 
be disabled—for example, he may be blind, deaf, or dumb and yet virtuous. 
So­which­of­these­models­is­correct?­Arguably,­the­first­model­appears­most­
plausible,­because­the­only­real­objection­to­it­was­that­the­definition­was­under-
inclusive, that is, it excluded such things as sexual dysfunction in elderly men and 
loss of hearing in elderly men and women. One could simply say that although such 
conditions do not technically count as disabilities, they are the objects of legitimate 
medical intervention insofar as they tend to hinder the pursuit of authentic human 
goods (such as friendship and procreation) and so are rightful objects of human 
medical intervention. 
4 Savulescu, “Autonomy, Well-Being, Disease, and Disability,” 64.
5 Ibid.
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Having considered the nature of disability, now let us consider the second 
question:­what­is­the­moral­status­of­severely­mentally­disabled­human­beings?­Two­
conclusions­to­this­question­are­available:­the­ethics­of­exclusion­and­the­ethics­of­
inclusion. The ethics of exclusion, borrowing Eva Feder Kittay’s apt phrase, holds 
that human beings with severe mental disability do not have basic human rights and 
need not be treated with respect. Scholars proposing an ethics of inclusion hold that 
all human beings, no matter how severe their mental disabilities, have equal basic 
moral status with all other human beings. 
Defenders­of­ the­ ethics­of­ exclusion­propose­diverse­ justifications­ for­ it.­A­
­Kantian­justification­focuses­on­the­lack­of­autonomy­of­the­severely­mentally­disabled.­
Without­endorsing­it,­Licia­Carlson­and­Kittay­describe­this­approach:­“The­view­
that those with cognitive impairments are not subject to the same basic rights and 
protections may also be inferred in Kant’s philosophy. Kant is generally taken to be 
the locus situ of the intimate connection between personhood, dignity and autonomy. 
He­writes:­‘Autonomy­then­is­the­basis­of­the­dignity­of­human­and­of­every­rational­
nature.’”6 Autonomy—the self-given law of practical reason—is vitally important 
for Kant because without it, a person cannot achieve the one thing that is worthwhile 
without­qualification­for­Kant:­namely,­the­good­will.­But­it­does­not­follow­from­this­
that those human beings who cannot choose autonomously at any particular moment 
in their lives or even for the whole of their lives lack a rational nature or do not have 
dignity in the sense of basic moral worth. Indeed, such a view is at odds with what 
Kant says in The Metaphysics of Morals:­“A­human­being­is­under­obligation­to­regard­
himself, as well as every other human being [als auch jeden anderen Menschen], as 
his end.”7 Kant scholar Patrick Kain points out, “There is substantial textual evidence 
indicating­Kant’s­judgment­about­human­moral­status:­all­human­beings­possess­moral­
status.”8­Kain­emphasizes­that­Kant’s­own­theory­is­inclusive­rather­than­exclusive­
with­respect­to­human­beings:
Within Kant’s theory, existence as a living member of the human species is 
taken­as­a­sufficient­ indication­of­basic­moral­status­because­membership­
in that species indicates the presence, in a perceptible being, of the status-
grounding predisposition to personality. Since, according to Kant’s Formula 
of Humanity, it is impermissible to treat any being with dignity as a mere 
means, Kant’s position entails that it is impermissible to fail to treat any 
human organism as an end-in-itself, which seems to entail a strong, though 
defeasible, presumption against, for example, the intentional killing of any 
human organism at any stage of its development.9
6 Licia­Carlson­ and­Eva­ Feder­Kittay,­ “Introduction:­Rethinking­ Philosophical­
Presuppositions in Light of Cognitive Disability,” Metaphilosophy 40.3–4­(July­2009):­310.
7 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals [Die Metaphysik der Sitten in zwei 
Teilen], 1797, quoted and translated by Patrick Kain in “Kant’s Defense of Human Moral 
Status,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 47.1­(2009):­63.
8 Kain, “Kant’s Defense of Human Moral Status,” 62.
9 Ibid., 100.
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Kant did not advocate an ethics of exclusion. Unless we are willing to deprive 
a human being in a temporary coma of rights, we should reject actual autonomy as 
a necessary condition for basic rights.
Other defenders of the ethics of exclusion appeal to certain threshold properties. 
It is implausible to exclude from full moral consideration human beings with any 
mental disability whatsoever, such as a touch of Asperger syndrome. On the other 
hand, advocates of the ethics of exclusion want to exclude some human beings from 
being counted as having moral worth equal to that of nondisabled human beings. 
Between the mildest of mental disabilities and the most severe, there are innumer-
able degrees of subtle difference. So the ethics of exclusion demands that a line be 
drawn at some point, making use of some threshold of a degreed characteristic, such 
as mental disability. 
Advocates of exclusion disagree about which degreed characteristic grants 
moral worth. Once an individual has a particular degree of intelligence, or a par-
ticular degree of the ability to communicate, or a particular degree of psychological 
connectedness to past, present, and future selves, then an individual gains moral 
inviolability. For Jeff McMahan, for example, if an individual lacks autonomy and 
therefore does not merit respect, the badness of death (and therefore the wrongful-
ness of killing) hinges on the degree of the psychological connectedness of the 
individual’s future and past selves.10 So if an individual has a strong psychological 
connectedness to future and past selves (like, for example, a human being with less-
than-severe mental disability), then killing is impermissible. On the other hand, if 
an individual does not have a strong psychological connection to future and past 
selves (such as a severely mentally handicapped woman or man), then he or she is 
not morally inviolable and may permissibly be intentionally killed. 
According to McMahan, at some point along the spectrum it becomes wrong 
to kill particular mentally disabled individuals. So let’s say one human adult, Jake, 
has just barely reached this point on the spectrum, but another human adult, Imani, 
is just barely shy of this point on the spectrum. Jake just barely meets the threshold 
of psychological connectedness, so he should not be killed. Imani just barely falls 
short of the threshold of psychological connectedness, so she may be killed. This is 
arbitrary. Miniscule differences in psychological properties cannot justify radical 
differences in treatment, like the difference between permissible and impermissible 
killing. Any proposal that the right to live depends on a degreed property will be 
similarly arbitrary.
I believe that all severely mentally handicapped human beings have equal basic 
moral status because all human beings have equal basic moral status.11 To be human 
is to be endowed with human rights. McMahan rejects this view, noting, “It would 
be odd, however, to suppose that to determine their moral status we would need to 
determine their species membership—that is, that the question of their moral status 
10 Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life­ (Oxford:­
Oxford University Press, 2002), 276.
11 For­one­justification,­see­S.­Matthew­Liao,­“The­Basis­of­Human­Moral­Status,”­
Journal of Moral Philosophy 7.2­(2010):­159–179.
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could be answered only with the assistance of a biologist.” 12 But a similar objection 
may be lodged against McMahan and other defenders of the ethics of exclusion. For 
McMahan, psychological capacities determine the moral status of individuals. It 
would be odd to suppose that the question of their moral status could be answered 
only­with­ the­ assistance­of­ a­psychologist.­ Indeed,­ the­difficulties­ for­ the­ ethics­
of exclusion are compounded. While a biologist can easily determine the species 
of­a­particular­organism,­it­is­much­more­difficult­for­a­psychologist­to­determine­
whether a particular human being has just reached or barely fallen shy of a particular 
threshold of some degreed quality like psychological connectedness, self-awareness, 
or rationality.  For such reasons, the ethics of exclusion should be rejected in favor 
of an ethics of inclusion that secures equality of basic rights for all human beings.
chrisTopher kAczor
12 Jeff  McMahan, “Cognitive Disability and Cognitive Enhancement,” Metaphilosophy 
40.3–4­(July­2009):­601.
